Just thought I'd include my review on Nussbaum requested by my prof for poverty research.
NUSSBAUM – FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE
The point of Nussbaum's book, as hinted at in the title "Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership" is to identify three weaknesses in the social contract (SC) tradition with respect to disability, transnational relations, and animals.
Nussbaum is explicitly writing in answer to, and improvement upon, the social contract theory, (cf. p. 10, p. 94) and notes particular features about one SC tradition, particularly in its Rawlsian formulation, which contribute towards the exclusion of disabled human beings and of other species, and that at least the Rawlsian version does not provide an adequate basis for just international relations in the contemporary world.
RESPONDING TO THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION
Working in Nussbaum's nuanced account of the social contract tradition, we note a keen insight of hers, namely, that the social contract tradition often conflates two questions that are in principle distinct: "By whom are society's basic principles designed?" and "For whom are society's basic principles designed?" (p. 16)
The issue cannot be simply solved by sharing and opening the task of designing society`s principles to every individual, nation, and to other species, in large part because of the parameters in which social contract theory works. The ``Circumstances of Justice`` (cf. p. 12 – articulated by Hume and approved by Rawls) according to which the parties are free, roughly equal in powers, independent, sharing same terrain, subject to conditions of “moderate scarcity” such that at the same time none achieve dominance and all would benefit from the exchange. Nussbaum notes that these “circumstances” ultimately do not apply to all those having stakes in concrete political life. Another issue is that not all share in the idealized rationality of political participants which Nussbaum notes remains a feature even of Hugh Grotius` (time period) political theory (Nussbaum otherwise appreciates and identifies with Grotius` approach, because of the associations of his theory with a ``natural law`` which allows Grotius to provide a rich account of the determinate ``good`` of the human being as being already social and politicized. While Nussbaum does not link these given elements about the ``good`` or ``goods`` of the human being to metaphysical statements, as does Grotius, Nussbaum's capabilities approach operates with a similarly determinate account of a human being whose good is indispensably intertwined with social and political life, a view which she also attributes to Aristotle and to Marx).
Ultimately, while Nussbaum states she is working in response to or in dialogue with the social contract tradition, it seems to me that very little of that tradition remains in the final product of her theory (at least within any of the three contemporary strains of SC theory motivations which she broadly characterizes as focusing for the motivation of the parties on a) mutual advantage, b) the “mixed” version of Rawls, and c) a justice based approach. The Rawlsian tradition in particular she notes does not seem to address these three urgent questions of “justice” in the contemporary world (and she traces some of the factors to other thinkers in the larger social contract tradition). If the social contract theory is formulated in terms of mutual advantage, either solely or at least significantly (as is the case with Rawls) and if such advantage is narrowly defined in terms of material gain, it is clear that Nussbaum is in a different sphere – that of “justice” as something that human beings love and do pursue for its own sake, and which cannot depend upon an assurance of or any necessary correlation with mutual advantage – cf. p. X).
Is the capabilities approach derivable from within or at least intertwinable with a social contract approach to accounting for and coping with questions of justice? Nussbaum does identify a fundamental difference in theoretical structure between her approach and typical contractarianism: contractarianism is a procedural theory while the capabilities approach centres on concrete social outcomes (cf. p. 81).
A term which Nussbaum uses is ``overlapping consensus`` (cf. Where) a kind of language which seems to suggest more a human rights approach than a SC procedure – (and indeed Nussbaum notes that the capabilities approach is a species of a human rights approach). She makes it clear that the capabilities are an open, somewhat abstractly conceived and formulated principles that allow space for given societies to work out exactly how they are realized in practice, although sufficiently determinate to provide grounds for respectful consensus and adequately identifiable internal and international standards for accountability (and thus she diverges from Sen's more open-ended approach by insisting on the possibility of a list; she herself provides ten basic forms of capabilities (available pages 76-78). Perhaps something like the kind of activity propounded in ``social contract`` theory obtains at the more practical levels, at both intra-national and international levels of determining policies, distributions, and use of resources, guided from the principles of capabilities as semi-determinate accounts of the goods of the human being.
“Capabilities” Approach: Context in Economic Theories
(Relative to the issue of poverty measurement)
Nussbaum notes the particular context of the capabilities approach (in its Sen version, which was the version that she noted and began to develop and contextualize philosophically) arose out of a response to a prevalent form of economic utiltiarianism in development economics. In her own words, it was "designed above all as an alternative to the economic-Utilitarian approaches which dominated, and to some degree still dominate, discussions of quality of life in international development and policy circles, especially approaches that understand the point of development in narrowly economic terms". (p. 71)
The popular GNP (Gross National Product) approach in development economics was "not very illuminating" about real human lives and Nussbaum proceeds to identify significant problems with the Utiltiarian approach in general. Nussbaum notes that the aggregation approach does not only obfuscate the fact that lives are distinct, but also confuses `distinct elements` of lives (e.g. liberty, economic well being, health, and education are not distinguished from each other in this crude measure). She notes Rawls' critique that this approach encourages trade-offs between goods (e.g. trading off political or religious liberty) to obtain largest social total (or average). Another issue is that utiltarianism simply does not regard what people can do and be - and Nussbaum notes the phenomena of "adaptive preference" according to which people adjust their preferences to what they think they can achieve within their own given socio-economic configuration. Finally, she notes that by focusing on the state of satisfaction, this theory (utiltiarianism) "shows deficient regard for agency.`` (I think from p. 71 and onwards)
The capabilities approach, in contrast, Nussbaum associates with the ``intuitive`` underlying conception of the dignity of the human being which is associated with the practical possibility of a life worthy of that dignity, which has available in it "truly human functioning," (referring to Marx`s 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, careful to distinguish between her political use of the term and a use which would attempt to formulate a comprehensive doctrine of human life, a distinction neglected by Marx.)
Nussbaum contrasts this approach with the approach of speaking in terms of "resources" as an index of well being which somehow skirts the crucial facts that "human beings have varying needs for resources, and also varying abilities to convert resources into functioning. Thus two people with similar quantities of resources may actually differ greatly in the ways that matter most for social justice. (cf. p. 75).
Here's where we see in relation to our own interests concerning ``poverty`` that many of the discourses on the definitions of poverty appear themselves to be ``impoverished`` - minimalistic, narrow, and negatively-formulated ways of considering the issues. By identifying concrete (Nussbaum does think it is possible to agree upon determinate capabilities, and she cites Maritain's observation about the possibility of agreeing on such principles – in Maritain's case, it was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) entitlements of the human being associable with capacities of that human being - by showing positive requirements and possibilities, it becomes possible for the discourses to become more enriched and attention focused on subjects of justice in a different way.
Nussbaum's ambition is to provide a minimal account of social justice, if a society does not guarantee this to all its citizens at some appropriate threshold level, it falls short of being a fully just society, whatever its level of opulence (interesting to contrast with Sachs approach, which is surprisingly optimistic and it appears to me, almost prepared to accept the difficulties of Bangladesh women labouring under conditions that would be unacceptable in OECD countries to some extent as the interim between now and economic success).
Nussbaum protects pluralism (the capabilities approach is a form of political liberalism after all) in many ways – by insisting this is an open-ended basket subject to normal revisions, by positing capability and not functioning as the goal: for example, Muslim women who veil themselves would be completely free to do so – the Nussbaum condition would be that they do not lack education, economic and other buttresses of autonomy – thus assuring their ability to have a real choice in such matters. The exceptions for Nussbaum would be children and animals whose capacity for consent is not fully developed (e.g. she supports compulsory primary education and an age of consent for sex) and in some cases, the mentally disabled, for whom in a case-by case basis it might be more appropriate to aim for functioning than for capability. She also includes major liberties which protect pluralism on the list, and insists on a strong separation between “justification” and “implementation” - rather than being a basis for military and economic sanctions, she considers these a basis for persuasive activities.
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MY OWN COMMENTS
Justice between nations
This takes a crucial place in Nussbaum's analysis: it is the second of the three major issues which she notes the Rawlsian tradition fails to address adequately. The concept of “free, equal, and independent” (read Hume's “circumstances of justice”) states she suggests is so far removed from today's world (configured not only by relations between states, but complicated by multinational corporations, economic relations, NGO's, and a host of other factors) as to be hardly useful, and is skeptical about a two-stage approach to social contract theory, namely, treating states as analogous to “moral persons”, noting that this assumes (where it cannot be assumed) that a state is first of all stable and secondly functions internally in a just way (and does not itself rely on exclusion of entire groups from political or economic or other participation).
Nussbaum devotes time also to critiquing Rawls' definition of what constitutes a “people” and finding his description not to add anything useful to the notion of a “state” prefers to focus on the latter concept. She mentions the issue of justice between nations in relation to the world of classic social contract doctrines – noting that its main theorists were “very well acquainted“ with wars between states and with the phenomena of trade and colonial expansion. Her critique of the SC tradition however, is that it seemed seemed possible to “adopt a thin approach” to international relations, focusing on issues of war and peace and refusing to discuss economic redistribution or protection for basic human rights (noting however the case of Grotius who had argued that peace would not be lasting if it failed to address economic redistribution) and notes this “thin” approach is increasingly inadequate today.
Nussbaum suggests that even if we were to “bracket” questions of “retrospective justice” created by legacy of colonialism (and I would say that she does bracket historical factors throughout the whole book: the basis for her argument is not so much historical as the more philosophical argument that accidents of birth should not “pervasively” influence a person's life chances) that urgent “forward-looking issues” of justice are in store. Even the best attempts from within the social contract tradition to solve these problems (she mentions Rawls, Pogge, and Beitz) prove insufficient guides to the complexity of the issues we face, and she argues the capabilities approach is more useful.
Policy and grassroots application
Nussbaum doesn`t fully develop the impacts which her theory can have from a practical involvement in “development” but understandably stays at the level of theory: she articulates general and abstract concepts which become principles for political thought, public policies, and fruitful practical comparison which challenges and shifts experiential learning. I can add to her discussions in this sense in speaking from my own observations in people-based development programs in Andhra Pradesh, India, I can say that engaging the people and investing in all their capacities in social and political forms of fostering - such as in the community-based development programs of Bala Vikasa also solves many practical problems which development agencies run into - of inapplicable, short term, culturally inappropriate or unilateral ``solutions`` which, in a top-down or policy-based approach, do not ``take root`` at the ground level, or at least not with the same success rate when more holistic and participatory alternatives are employed). Engaging the capabilities of persons and communities in the process of assuring their capabilities are fulfilled is more likely to ensure that interdependent rights are achieved (all rights interconnective and non-fungible, as Nussbaum notes, and the enduring limitation of policy-based initiatives is that they can never quite address issues holistically). Nussbaum's theory has occasionally been characterized as “paternalistic” and she herself applies the term to human-animal relationships in a more positive sense of the term. But the focus of her book concerns the fact that it is special-needs people and other species who are left out, so her discussions are oriented in that direction. On the other hand, it is important, I think, not to confuse an “entitlement” with a “duty” because it has been a problem in economic theories (such as those of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations) that poverty is a matter of tightening belts and taking responsibility for one's situation. Nussbaum discusses O'Neill's emphasis on duties as a way to initiate discussion about these issues but prefers her entitlement-based-account. In terms of practical application, she does give concrete recommendations when she discusses the disabled, for example.
Peripheral note
As a specific issue that Nussbaum draws attention to in the question of addressing justice for mentally or physically disabled, she notes this involves a justice issue not only for them, but for those who care for them, and that issues such as allocation, labor involved in caring, and social costs of promoting fuller inclusion of disabled citizens need to come into focus (cf. p. 33). In poverty, the costs which are incurred by caring work are important. I have done research on a related question in the past concerning correlations between motherhood and poverty for a woman, for example, and I think interesting work could be done in these kinds of matters.
Closing comments
It was difficult to abstract the economic application of Nussbaum's principles in relation to specific questions on poverty, although it is easy to see how the capabilities approach enters as an alternative form of – or at least a critique of current – poverty measurements. Ultimately, however, this text (Frontiers of Justice) was one that is strongly inserted with, and dialoguing with a political philosophy tradition to point out urgent questions today which such theories fail to cope with but it necessarily remained highly abstract, in part intentionally because Nussbaum's proposal was to introduce a more helpful political conception of the human being for initiating more practical discussions by starting with principles. I think perhaps to really explore and derive the benefit of the capabilities approach in relation to other areas of research, it would be helpful for me to further explore the critiques of Sen or the other works of Nussbaum which are more closely united to concrete issues which she identifies in real societies (as for example, in Sex and Social Justice or Women in Human Development.)
